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Abstract
This paper addresses the design of a dedicated homophonic coding for a class of communication
systems which, in order to provide both reliability and security, first encode the data before encrypting
it, which is referred to as the encoding-encryption paradigm. The considered systems employ error-
correction coding for reliability, a stream cipher for encryption, and homophonic coding to enhance the
protection of the key used in the stream cipher, on which relies the security of all the system transmissions.
This paper presents a security evaluation of such systems from a computational complexity point of
view, which serves as a source for establishing dedicated homophonic code design criteria. The security
evaluation shows that the computational complexity of recovering the secret key, given all the information
an attacker could gather during passive attacks he can mount, is lower bounded by the complexity of the
related LPN (Learning Parity in Noise) problem in both the average and worst case. This gives guide-
lines to construct a dedicated homophonic encoder which maximizes the complexity of the underlying
LPN problem for a given encoding overhead. Finally, this paper proposes a generic homophonic coding
strategy that fulfills the proposed design criteria and thus both enhances security while minimizing the
induced overhead.
Keywords: (wireless) communications systems, homophonic coding, error-correction coding, stream ci-
phers, randomness, security evaluation, LPN problem.
1 Introduction
Most communication systems take into account not only the reliability but also the security of the data
they transmit. This is particularly true in wireless environments, where the data is inherently more sensible
to security threats. Consequently, the system design needs to include both coding schemes for providing
error-correction and ciphering algorithms for encryption-decryption. It is common practice to first encrypt
the data to ensure the security, and then to encode for reliability purposes. In this paper, we focus on those
communication systems which adopt the reverse approach: they first encode the data, and then encrypt
it, which we call the encoding-encryption paradigm. A famous illustrative example is the most widespread
standard for mobile telephony GSM, standing for “Global System for Mobile Communications” (see [4] and
[3], for the coding, respectively security details).
In the considered system, encryption-decryption is done through a stream cipher, since the receiver
needs to first decrypt the data despite the noise, before performing the decoding, which cannot be done
through block ciphers. Consequently the security of the system relies crucially on the private key used in the
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stream cipher and thus when we refer to the security of systems using the encoding-encryption paradigm,
we implicitly mean the security of the keystream generator and the users’ secret key.
Motivation for the Work. Homophonic coding (see [8] and [9]) is a natural technique to enhance the security
of systems employing the encoding-encryption paradigm, since it injects extra randomness in the system,
which increases the confusion of a possible adversary by amplifying the channel noise that he experiences.
This idea has been recently exploited in [11] and [12], where it was shown from an information-theoretic point
of view that with the aid of a dedicated homophonic encoder, the amount of uncertainty that the adversary
must face about the secret key given all the information he could gather during different passive or active
attacks he can mount, is a decreasing function of the samples available for cryptanalysis. This means that
there is a threshold before which the homophonic encoding indeed provides a certain level of unconditional
security, but after a large sample is collected, the uncertainty tends to zero, entering a regime in which a
computational security analysis is needed for estimating the resistance against the secret key recovery. This
paper addresses this computational complexity security evaluation, and highlights how the computational
security is related to the homophonic coding design.
Summary of the Results. This paper proposes a homophonic code design derived from a security evaluation of
the secret key recovery which shows that the security of systems using the encoding-encryption approach can
be related to the complexity of solving certain LPN (Learning Parity with Noise) problems. It follows from
this analysis that the dedicated homophonic encoding plays a role in securing the system, and that a careful
design makes the underlying LPN problem heavily more complex in the average case. This gives guidelines for
the design of a dedicated homophonic encoder, that comprises five conditions, two related to the information
theoretical security, two regarding the computational security, and one concerning implementation costs. We
finally propose a homophonic coding strategy which fulfills all the given criteria.
Organization of the Paper. Section 2 introduces the background for the problem addressed in this paper.
Section 3 contains the security evaluation from a computational complexity point of view. Implications of
the security evaluation on the design of a dedicated homophonic coding are discussed in Section 4, where the
code design criteria are established, while the code constructions are given in Section 5. Concluding remarks
including some directions for future work are given in Section 6.
2 Background
We consider a class of communication systems which, in order to provide both reliability and security,
employs the encoding-encryption paradigm, namely: the message is first encoded employing error-correction
coding for the purpose of reliability and then encrypted using a stream ciphering. It has been shown in
[11] and [12] via an information-theoretic analysis that the use of a dedicated homophonic/wiretap encoding
enhances the security of such systems. This section summarizes the reported design and the results of its
information-theoretic security evaluation.
2.1 System Model
In systems employing the encoding-encryption paradigm (as shown in Figure 1), a stream cipher is used, on
which relies the security of the whole system. It is thus crucial to focus on the security of its private key.
The system reported and analyzed in [11] and [12] aims at increasing the security of the private key against
both passive and active attacks by introducing a dedicated homophonic/wire-tap encoder which involves
extra randomness as follows. Let k be the private key, let CH(·) denote a homophonic encoder, added at
the transmitter, and let
u = [ui]
m−ℓ
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}
m−l
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Figure 1: Considered communication system model including homophonic coding.
be a vector of pure randomness1 where each ui is the realization of a random variable Ui with distribution
Pr(Ui = 1) = Pr(Ui = 0) = 1/2. The homophonic encoder is positioned before the error-correcting encoder
CECC(·), thus out of the m bits of data to be sent, m− l are replaced by random data, letting actually only
l bits
a = [ai]
l
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}
l
of plaintext, to get
y = y(k) = CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ x (1)
as codeword to be sent, where x = x(k) is the output of the keystream generator. We assume that both
homophonic and error-correction encoding are linear operations, so that
CH(a||u) = [a||u]GH , (2)
where GH is an m×m matrix, and thus
CECC(CH(a||u)) = CECC([a||u]GH)
= [a||u]GHGECC
= [a||u]G (3)
where GECC is an m × n binary generator matrix corresponding to CECC(·), and G = GHGECC is an
m× n binary matrix summarizing the two successive encodings at the transmitter. This homophonic/wire-
tap approach is a natural candidate for security enhancement, since homophonic (resp. wire-tap) coding is a
well-known technique to create confusion while performing source (resp. channel coding): on the one hand,
homophonic coding [9] provides (i) multiple substitutions of a given source vector via randomness so that
the coded versions of the source vectors appear as realizations of a random source; (ii) recoverability of the
source vector based on the given codeword without knowledge of the randomization. On the other hand,
1Although it is assumed for simplicity of presentation, the randomness involved does not need to be ”perfect” because the
role of randomness is just to enhance security of the employed keystream generator and not to perform encryption itself. In other
words, the randomness involved does not need to fulfill all the requirements as the randomness for one-time pad encryption,
and accordingly implementation issues become substantially simpler.
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the main goals of wire-tap channel coding (see [14] and [13] when the main channel is error-free) are: (i)
amplification of the noise difference between the main and wire-tap channel via randomness; (ii) a reliable
transmission in the main channel and at the same time to provide a total confusion of the wire-tapper who
observes the communication in the main channel via a noisy channel (wire-tap channel).
In this paper we assume that transmission occurs via a binary symmetric channel (BSC)2 with known
crossover probability p, so that the receiver obtains
z = z(k) = y ⊕ v = CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ x⊕ v (4)
where v = [vi]
n
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}
n and vi is the realization of a binary random variable Vi such that Pr(Vi = 0) =
1− p and Pr(Vi = 1) = p. Since he knows the private key, the receiver starts with the decryption
y = (CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ x⊕ v) ⊕ x = CECC(CH(a||u)) ⊕ v
and then decodes
CH(a||u).
If the decoding is successful, a is recovered using C−1H and the receiver informs the transmitter via a feedback
link that he could decode. Otherwise he informs the transmitter that retransmission is required.
In the meantime, the adversary keeps on listening and collects over time samples {z(t)}τt=1 such that
z(t) = CECC(CH(a
(t)||u(t)))⊕ x(t) ⊕ v(t) , t = 1, 2, ..., τ . (5)
employing the notation a(t) = [a
(t)
i ]
ℓ
i=1 for the plain text, u
(t) = [u
(t)
i ]
m−ℓ
i=1 for the pure randomness used in
the homophonic encoder, v(t) = [v
(t)
i ]
n
i=1 for the channel noise, and z
(t) = [z
(t)
i ]
n
i=1 for the received signal.
The main feature of the dedicated homophonic coding used in [11]-[12] is that the encoding is based
on randomness and that the legitimate receiver who shares a secret key with the transmitter can perform
decoding without knowledge of the randomness employed for the encoding, as shown above. As a result, the
decoding complexity without knowledge of the secret key employed in the system approaches the complexity
of the exhaustive search for the secret key. The encoding-encryption paradigm for secure and reliable commu-
nications enjoys the following desirable properties: (i) when the decryption is performed by bitwise XORing
the keystream to the ciphertext, an error in a bit before decryption causes an error in the corresponding bit
after decryption, without any error-propagation, and (ii) provides non-availability of the error-free keystream
when the communication channel is a noisy one.
2.2 Information-Theoretic Security Evaluation
It has been shown in [11] and [12] that from an information-theoretic point of view, it is enough to use
a generic wire-tap encoder to increase the security of the system. Namely, under the assumptions that
the homophonic encoding matrix GH defined in (2) (i) is invertible, so that the receiver can decode the
homophonic encoding, and (ii) maps [a||u] so that in the resulting vector each bit of ciphertext z is affected
by at least one random bit from u, to make sure that each bit of ciphertext is protected, then the homophonic
(wire-tap channel) encoding increases the security of the private key k under both passive and active attacks,
where the attacker can modify the ciphertext and learn the effects of these modifications through the feedback
link. More precisely
Theorem 1 Let
Z(t) = CECC(CH(A
(t)||U(t)))⊕ f (t)(K) +V(t) , t = 1, 2, ..., τ , (6)
be the samples available for cryptanalysis obtained over a period of τ times, where A(t) = [A
(t)
i ]
ℓ
i=1, U
(t) =
[U
(t)
i ]
m−ℓ
i=1 , V
(t) = [V
(t)
i ]
n
i=1 and Z
(t) = [Z
(t)
i ]
n
i=1, are random variables with entropy H(A), H(U), H(V )
and H(Z), representing respectively the data to be sent, pure randomness involved in the wire-tap encoder,
2A more general class of binary channels was discussed in [11] and [12].
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random noise, and signals seen by the attacker. Let K be a binary vector random variable uniformly chosen
representing the key, such that H(K) = |K|, and f (j)(·), j = 1, 2, ..., t, are given deterministic functions
describing the keystream generator, that is, X(t) = f (t)(K). When Pr(V ji = 0) 6= Pr(V
j
i = 1) 6= 1/2,
i = 1, 2, ..., n, j = 1, 2, ..., t, we have:
H(K|A,Z)
{
> 0 for τ < τmin
→ 0 for τ ≥ τmin
(7)
for A = [A(1)||A(2)||...||A(τ)] and Z = [Z(1)||Z(2)||...||Z(τ)].
This theorem statement is interpreted as follows. The uncertainty on the key, measured by the equivoca-
tion of the key assuming a known plaintext attack implies, an information-theoretic security assuming that
a limited sample only is available for cryptanalysis. This information-theoretic security appears as a conse-
quence of the randomness involved via the homophonic coding as well as the communication channel noise.
It has been shown in [11]-[12] that the randomness introduced via homophonic coding has a heavy impact on
providing the information-theoretic security. On the other hand, the theorem statement also points out that
the information-theoretic security does not hold anymore if an attacker can collect an enough large sample
for cryptanalysis, i.e., if the parameter τ is large enough the equivocation reduces to zero which implies that
the secret key is recoverable assuming availability of certain computational power. Accordingly, as long as
τ < τthresh, the key is protected by the randomness of the homophonic encoder and of the noisy channel in
an information-theoretic manner, but that protection cannot last forever if the adversary collects too much
data. This does not say that it is easy for the adversary to recover the key, as will be discussed below, but
only that the information-theoretic security does not hold anymore.
3 Computational Complexity Security Evaluation
This section analyzes the security of the proposed scheme from a computational complexity point of view in
the chosen plaintext attacking (CPA) scenario. In this case, the security evaluation consists of establishing
how hard it is to find the secret key based on the algebraic representation of the encryption. We will show in
our complexity analysis that the hardness of recovering the key relies on the hardness of the LPN problem
(see [2],[5], [7], for example). The analysis will pinpoint the features that the homophonic encoder should
have so as to create an increased complexity of the underlying LPN problem in the average case.
3.1 Preliminaries
We consider the scenario where enough large samples {z(t)}τt=1 have been recorded by an attacker, who can
now try to find the employed secret key k contained in xt = x(t)(k) using from (5)
z(t) = CECC(CH(a
(t)||u(t)))⊕ x(t) ⊕ v(t) , t = 1, 2, ..., τ ,
since he has a probability of error in recovering the key which now tends to zero.
For the simplicity of exposition, we assume from now on that |K| = n. We further perform the security
evaluation under the following two assumptions:
• x(t) = f (t)(k) = kSt, t = 1, 2, ..., τ , where S = [si,j ]
n
i=1
n
j=1, is a binary matrix, and
St = [S
(t)
1 ,S
(t)
2 , ...,S
(t)
n ] (8)
where each S
(t)
i , i = 1, 2, ..., n, denotes a column of the tth power of the matrix S; note that usually
f (t)(·) is a heavily nonlinear function, and its consideration as a linear one actually implies a scenario
for evaluation of a lower bound of the complexity for the secret key recovery;
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• we consider the chosen plaintext attack where the data is the whole zero vector, i.e. a(t) = 0, for each
t.
Under the above assumptions, and recalling from (3) that both CECC and CH are linear encoders, we
can write
kSt ⊕ [0||u(t)]G = z(t) ⊕ v(t),
from which we obtain an algebraic representation of the recovery problem in terms of a noisy system of linear
equations, as seen by the adversary:

kS
(t)
1
kS
(t)
2
...
kS
(t)
n

⊕


[0||u(t)]G1[
0||u(t)
]
G2
...[
0||u(t)
]
Gn

 =


z
(t)
1
z
(t)
2
...
z
(t)
n

⊕


v
(t)
1
v
(t)
2
...
v
(t)
n

 , t = 1, 2, ..., τ, (9)
where u(t) = [u
(t)
i ]
m−ℓ
i=1 and Gi denotes the ith column of G.
Remark 1 Note that in the set {
[
0||u(t)
]
Gi}
n
i=1 all the elements could be split into two non-overlapping
subsets such that a subset contains k linearly independent elements, k at most m− ℓ, and the other subset
contains n − k elements each of which is a linear combination of the elements from the first set, since[
0||u(t)
]
G only involves the lower part of G, which is an (m− l)× n matrix, which has thus at most m− l
linearly independent columns, and the other columns can be obtained as linear combinations.
The problem of solving a system of linear equations in the presence of noise is related to the so-called
LNP problem, defined formally as follows.
Definition - The LPN Problem. Let 〈·|·〉 denote the binary inner product. Let s be a random n-bit
vector, let ǫ ∈]0, 1/2[ be a constant noise parameter, let Berǫ be the Bernoulli distribution with parameter ǫ
(so if ν ← Berǫ then Pr(ν = 0) = ǫ and Pr(ν = 0) = 1− ǫ), and let As,ǫ be the distribution defined as
{a← {0, 1}n; ν ← Berǫ : (a, 〈s|a〉 ⊕ ν)}
Let As,ǫ denote an oracle which outputs independent samples according to the above distribution. An
algorithmM is said to (q, t,m, θ)-solve the LPNn,ǫ problem if
Pr[s← {0, 1}n :MAs,ǫ(1n) = s] ≥ θ ,
and furthermore M runs in time at most t, memory at most m, and makes at most q queries to its oracle.
What the LPN problem captures is that, given a security parameter k, a secret vector x, and g1, ...,gn
randomly chosen binary vectors of length n = O(k), it is possible knowing yi = 〈x|gi〉 and {gi}
n
i=1 to solve
for x using standard linear-algebraic techniques as long as there is no noise. However, when each yi is flipped
(independently) with probability p, finding x becomes much more difficult. The problem of learning x in
this latter case is refereed to as the learning parity in noise (LPN) problem.
Finally note that the LPN problem is equivalent to the problem of decoding of a general linear block code
and it is known that this problem is NP-complete [1], and that relating security of an encryption technique to
the LPN problem has been employed for security evaluation of certain stream ciphers (see [10], for example).
3.2 Complexity Evaluation
A systematic way to solve a system of linear equations, with or without noise, is to perform a Gaussian
elimination. If the system furthermore contains unknowns that we are not interested in finding, it is natural
to start by removing them, so as to obtain a system with a smaller number of equations, where only the
unknowns we would like to find are left. We will now show how such a strategy changes the noise present in
the system of equations.
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Lemma 1 Consider the following system of N equations over the binary field GF (2) to be solved for
x1, . . . , xL, L ≤ N :
(
L⊕
j=1
α
(i)
j xj)⊕ yi = zi ⊕ ei , i = 1, 2, ...,M ,
(
L⊕
j=1
α
(i)
j xj)⊕ (
M⊕
j=1
β
(i)
j yj) = zi ⊕ ei , i = M + 1,M + 2, ..., N , (10)
where {zi}
N
i=1, {α
(i)
j }
L
j=1
N
i=1 and {β
(i)
j }
M
j=1
N
i=1 are known, {xj}
L
j=1, {yj}
M
j=1 and {ei}
N
i=1 are unknown, and
each ei is a realization of a random variable Ei such that Pr(Ei = 1) = p < 1/2, i = 1, 2, ..., N . If
1. the Hamming weight of each vector [β
(i)
1 , . . . , β
(i)
M ] is greater or equal to some parameter w, for i =
M + 1,M + 2, ..., N ,
2. and no
⊕M
j=1 β
(k)
j yj, k ∈ {M + 1,M + 2, . . . , N}, is a linear combination of any other w or less⊕M
j=1 β
(i)
j yj, i ∈ {M+1,M+2, . . . , N}, i.e., there are at least w linearly independent sums
⊕M
j=1 β
(i)
j yj
among those i ∈ {M + 1, . . . , N},
then, the problem of recovering the unknown x1, x2, . . . , xL is the problem of solving the following system of
equations:
(
M⊕
k=1
β
(i)
k (
L⊕
j=1
α
(k)
j xj))⊕ (
L⊕
j=1
α
(i)
j xj) = zi ⊕ (
M⊕
k=1
β
(i)
k zk)⊕ e
∗
i , i = M + 1,M + 2, ..., N , (11)
where e∗j is a realization of a random variable E
∗
j such that Pr(E
∗
j = 1) > pw =
1−(1−2p)w+1
2 .
Proof. For every i ∈ {M +1,M +2, ..., N}, adding the following linear combination of the first M equations
(
M⊕
k=1
β
(i)
k (
L⊕
j=1
α
(k)
j xj))⊕ (
M⊕
k=1
β
(i)
k yk) =
M⊕
k=1
β
(i)
k (zk ⊕ ek) , (12)
to the ith equations of the system yields:
(
M⊕
k=1
β
(i)
k (
L⊕
j=1
α
(k)
j xj))⊕ (
L⊕
j=1
α
(i)
j xj) = zi ⊕ (
M⊕
k=1
β
(i)
k zk)⊕ ei ⊕ (
M⊕
k=1
β
(i)
k ek) . (13)
We are left to compute the probability Pr(E∗i = 1), where
E∗i = Ei ⊕ (
M⊕
k=1
β
(i)
k Ek), i =M + 1, . . . , N.
Since i ≥ M + 1, Ei is independent of β
(i)
k Ek for every 1 ≤ k ≤ M . We are thus summing the components
of the vector
[Ei, E1β
(i)
1 , . . . , EMβ
(i)
M ]
and
Pr(E∗i = 1) = 1− Pr(E
∗
i = 0)
= 1− Pr(Ei ⊕ (
M⊕
k=1
β
(i)
k Ek = 0)).
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Now the probability that an even number of digits are 1 in a sequence of M + 1 independent binary digits
is [6, Lemma 1]
1 + (1− 2p)M+1
2
if p is the probability that every digit is 1. Since
1 + (1− 2p)M
2
>
1 + (1− 2p)M+1
2
, p < 1/2,
we have that
1−
1 + (1− 2p)M
2
< 1−
1 + (1− 2p)M+1
2
,
and
Pr(E∗i = 1) = 1− Pr(Ei ⊕ (
M⊕
k=1
β
(i)
k Ek = 0))
> 1−
1 + (1− 2p)w+1
2
=
1− (1− 2p)w+1
2
since by assumption 1., the weight of each vector of [β
(i)
1 , . . . β
(i)
M ] is at leastw, and according to the assumption
2., there is no linear combination of the equations which can reduce the corruption noise value lower bounded
by pw (i.e., it cannot be reduced via any further linear processing of the system of equations). 
This leads to the main evaluation result:
Theorem 2 The complexity of recovering the secret key k based on the algebraic representation of the scheme
is lower bounded by the complexity of solving the LPNn,ǫ problem where, ǫ =
1−(1−2p)w+1
2 and n, w and p
are the parameters of the scheme, representing resp. the length of the key, a parameter of the homophonic
encoder and the probability of the BSC.
Proof. From (9), we have the following system of τn overdefined consistent but probabilistic equations over
the binary field GF (2):
kS
(t)
1 ⊕ [0||u
(t)]G1 = z
(t)
1 ⊕ v
(t)
1
kS
(t)
2 ⊕ [0||u
(t)]G2 = z
(t)
2 ⊕ v
(t)
2
...
kS
(t)
n ⊕ [0||u(t)]Gn = z
(t)
n ⊕ v
(t)
n
, t = 1, 2, ..., τ , (14)
where each equation is correct with probability equal to p, 0 is a ℓ-dimensional vector of all zeroes, and
u(t) = [u
(t)
i ]
m−ℓ
i=1 .
The above system of equations fits the setting of Lemma 1, since we have N = τn equations, for
L = n unknown, where
⊕L
j=1 α
(k)
j xj , k = 1, . . . , N correspond to kS
(t)
i , i = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, . . . , τ , and yj ,
j = 1, . . . ,M together with
⊕M
j=1 β
(k)
j yj for k = M + 1, . . . , N correspond to [0||u
(t)]Gi, i = 1, . . . ,M ,
t = 1, . . . , τ , since according to Remark 1, we can indeed separate the {[0||u(t)]Gi}
n
i=1 for every t into one
set of linear independent vectors, and another set which is obtained as linear combinations of the first set
(M is then τk, where k is at most m− l).
Note that the above system of τn equations contains only n+ τ(m− ℓ) unknown variables, and that our
goal is to recover k only, i.e., we do not have any interest in recovering {u
(t)
i }
m−ℓ
i=1 , t = 1, 2, ..., τ . Thus, via
8
Gaussian elimination, we can remove the τ(m− l) unknown {u
(t)
i }
m−ℓ
i=1 , t = 1, 2, ..., τ , and obtain τ(n−m+ ℓ)
equations where only k is unknown. This transforms the initial system of τn equations into the following
one with τ(n −m− ℓ) equations (in total) and n unknowns k:
L
(k)
1 (k) = L
(z)
1 ([z
(t)
i ]
n
i=1)⊕ L
(v)
1 ([v
(t)
i ]
n
i=1)
L
(k)
2 (k) = L
(z)
2 ([z
(t)
i ]
n
i=1)⊕ L
(v)
2 ([v
(t)
i ]
n
i=1)
...
L
(k)
n−m+ℓ(k) = L
(z)
n−m+ℓ([z
(t)
i ]
n
i=1)⊕ L
(v)
n−m+ℓ([v
(t)
i ]
n
i=1)
, t = 1, 2, ..., τ , (15)
where L
(k)
j (·), L
(z)
j (·) and L
(v)
j (·), j = 1, 2, ..., n−m+ℓ, are linear functions, all of them specified by the matrix
G and the Gaussian elimination used to remove the random bits u(t), while L
(k)
j (·) further depends on the
matrix St. Note that the Gaussian elimination of the variables {u
(t)
i }
m−ℓ
i=1 , can be performed independently
for each t, implying that the entire complexity (for t = 1, 2, ..., τ) is upper-bonded by τO(n2.7) assuming
employment of the most efficient algorithm for the Gaussian processing.
Lemma 1 and its underlying assumptions provide that each equation in (15) is correct with some proba-
bility lower than 1− pw, where
pw =
1− (1− 2p)w+1
2
,
since the noise (v∗1)
(t) = L
(v)
1 ([v
(t)
i ]
n
i=1), . . . , (v
∗
n−m+ℓ)
(t) = L
(v)
n−m+ℓ([v
(t)
i ]
n
i=1) has coefficients that are the
realization of a random variable which takes value 1 with probability greater than pw =
1−(1−2p)w+1
2 . The
above system of τ(n−m+ ℓ) equations can consequently be rewritten as:
L∗1([ki]
n
i=1) = L
(z)
1 ([z
(1)
i ]
n
i=1)
L∗2([ki]
n
i=1) = L
(z)
2 ([z
(1)
i ]
n
i=1)
...
L∗n−m+ℓ([ki]
n
i=1) = L
(z)
n−m+ℓ([z
(1)
i ]
n
i=1)
L∗n−m+ℓ+1([ki]
n
i=1) = L
(z)
1 ([z
(2)
i ]
n
i=1)
L∗n−m+ℓ+2([ki]
n
i=1) = L
(z)
2 ([z
(2)
i ]
n
i=1)
...
L∗
τ(n−m+ℓ)([ki]
n
i=1) = L
(z)
n−m+ℓ([z
(τ)
i ]
n
i=1)
(16)
where each equation is incorrect with probability greater than pw =
1−(1−2p)w+1
2 , and where L
∗
j , j =
1, 2, ..., τ(n−m+ ℓ), are linear functions.
We finally get:
〈k|c1〉 = d1
〈k|c2〉 = d2
...
〈k|cn−m+ℓ〉 = dm−n+ℓ
〈k|cn−m+ℓ+1〉 = dm−n+ℓ+1
〈k|cn−m+ℓ+2〉 = dm−n+ℓ+2
...
〈k|cτ(n−m+ℓ)〉 = dτ(m−n+ℓ)
, (17)
where each equation is correct with a probability upper-bounded by 1 − pw = 1 −
1−(1−2p)w+1
2 , and where
the n-dimensional binary vectors {cj}
τ(n−m+ℓ)
j=1 and {dj}
τ(n−m+ℓ)
j=1 are known.
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According to the definition of the LPN problem and the above representation, the problem of recovering
the secret key is at least as hard as the LPNn,ǫ problem with ǫ =
1−(1−2p)w+1
2 , which concludes the proof of
the theorem. 
4 Homophonic Encoder Design Criteria
From the above computational security evaluation, it is clear that the design of the homophonic encoder
influences the computational complexity of cryptanalysis. In this section, we explicit code design criteria for
homophonic coding, taking into account not only the computational and information theoretical security,
but also the implementation complexity. Requirements can be expressed either as a function of GH given
GECC , or as a joint function of GH and GECC .
Indeed, the latter holds in the case of a design of the encoding-encryption system from scratch, where the
design should include a coding box which performs the concatenation of homophonic and error-correction
coding in a manner which fits the rate of the concatenated code to the given constraints. The former on
the other hand applies when upgrading existing systems employing the encoding-encryption paradigm, in
which case, the implementation assumption is that the employed, already existing, binary linear block error-
correction code (m,n) which encodes m bits into a codeword from GF (2n), could be replaced with a binary
block code (m′, n) with the same error correction capability but with m′ > m. Accordingly, m′−m random
bits can be concatenated with m information bits and mapped into the new m′-bits via a homophonic
encoder. The obtained output from the homophonic encoder is the input for the error-correcting one.
We recall first that the basic requirements on the matrix GH , as far as information theoretical security
is concerned, are [11, 12]:
• Invertibility. The matrix GH should be an invertible matrix, so that the receiver can decode the
homophonic encoding.
• Security. The matrix GH should map [a||u] so that in the resulting vector each bit of data from a
is affected by at least one random bit from u (to provide a background that each bit of cipheretext is
affected by at least one bit of u).
4.1 Computational complexity design criteria
Recall from (3) that
CECC(CH(a||u)) = [a||u]GHGECC
= [a||u]G
whereG = [gi,j ]
m
i=1
n
j=1 is anm×nmatrix containing both the homophonic and the error correction encoding.
The basic design requirements for a suitable homophonic encoder, i.e., the matrix GH , are pointed
out above, and this section contains additional guidelines to design a dedicated homophonic encoding which
provides maximum complexity of the underlying LPN problem for given implementation and communications
overhead.
It is well known that the hardness of the LPNn,ǫ problem in the average case, heavily depends on the
parameter ǫ (see [5] and [7], for example). On the other hand, Theorem 2 implies that the parameter ǫ
depends on the minimal value of the basic equations which should be linearly combined in order to eliminate
the random variables from each equation of the system. Accordingly, Theorem 2 implies the following design
criteria for construction of the matrix GH .
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• Weight. For a given error-correcting code generator matrix GECC , specify the homophonic code
matrix GH so that the resulting matrix GH = [g
(H)
ij ]
m
i=1
m
j=1 satisfies:
m−ℓ∑
i=1
g
(H)
ℓ+i,m−ℓ+j ≥ w , j = 1,m− ℓ+ 2, . . . , l ,
where w is a parameter.
• Dependability. According to (14)-(16), the sub-matrix of the matrix G consisting of its m − ℓ last
rows should be such that any of the columns is a linear combination of at least w other columns.
Consider thus the sub-matrix G∗ determined by the rows m − ℓ + 1,m − ℓ + 2, . . . ,m and columns
1, 2, . . . , n of the matrixG. We require that no column of the matrixG∗ is equal to a linear combination
of w or less other columns of G∗. This can be rephrased by asking
rank(G∗) ≥ w + 1.
4.2 Implementation design criteria
On the sender side, both the homophonic and error-correcting encodings are performed via a single vector-
matrix multiplication employing the matrix G =GHGCEE .
On the receiver side the error-correction decoding and the homophonic decoding should be performed
independently. First the errors should be corrected by the error-correction decoding, because the homophonic
decoding requires error-free decoding input.
This implies that in order to minimize the implementation complexity, a desirable property is sparseness
of the related matrices GH , G and G
−1
H .
• Sparsity. For a given error-correcting code generator matrixGECC , and a given security parameter w,
specify the homophonic encoding matrix GH in such a manner that either it is sparse or the resulting
matrix G is sparse to provide minimization of the implementation complexity on the sender side, and
at the same time the matrix G−1H is sparse in order to avoid too high computation overhead for the
receiver.
5 Homophonic Code Constructions
Let us first write the m×m wire-tap matrix GH and the m× n error-correcting matrix GECC as
GH =
[
G
(1)
H G
(2)
H
Im−l G
(4)
H
]
, GECC =
[
G
(1)
ECC
G
(2)
ECC
]
(18)
where G
(1)
H is an l × (m − l) matrix, G
(2)
H is an l × l matrix, Im−l denotes the (m − l) × (m − l) identity
matrix, G
(4)
H is an (m− l)× l matrix written as
G
(4)
H =


g
(H)
ℓ+1,m−ℓ+1 g
(H)
ℓ+1,m−ℓ+2 . . . g
(H)
ℓ+1,m
g
(H)
ℓ+2,m−ℓ+1 g
(H)
ℓ+2,m−ℓ+2 . . . g
(H)
ℓ+2,m
...
... . . .
...
g
(H)
m,m−ℓ+1 g
(H)
m,m−ℓ+2 . . . g
(H)
m,m

 ,
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G
(1)
ECC is an (m− l)× n matrix and finally G
(2)
ECC is an l × n matrix, so that
G = GHGECC
=
[
G
(1)
H G
(2)
H
Im−l G
(4)
H
][
G
(1)
ECC
G
(2)
ECC
]
=
[
G
(1)
H G
(1)
ECC +G
(2)
H G
(2)
ECC
G
(1)
ECC +G
(4)
H G
(2)
ECC
]
.
5.1 A generic construction
We now give a general construction method for the matrix GH . Choose first
G
(1)
H = 0l×(m−l), G
(2)
H = Il.
Let us check that we already satisfy the information theoretical requirements.
• Invertibility. Since GH is a square matrix, we can rephrase its invertibility using its determinant by
asking
det(GH) 6= 0.
Using Schur complement, this is equivalent to
det(G
(2)
H −G
(1)
H G
(4)
H ) 6= 0.
The above choice of G
(1)
H and G
(2)
H gives det(Il) 6= 0 which always holds, so that the invertibility
condition is taken care of.
• Security. The matrix GH should map [a||u] so that in the resulting vector each bit of data from a is
affected by at least one random bit from u. Since
[a||u]
[
0l×(m−l) Il
Im−l G
(4)
H
]
= [u, a+ uG
(4)
H ],
it is enough that G
(4)
H has no column with only zeroes to get that indeed each bit of data from a is
affected by at least one random bit from u.
We next look at the conditions coming from computational security. The weight condition can be
rephrased as requiring that each column of G
(4)
H has Hamming weight at least w, which automatically
makes sure that G
(4)
H has no column with only zeroes.
The dependability condition relates to the sub-matrixG∗ determined by the rowsm−ℓ+1,m−ℓ+2, . . . ,m
and columns 1, 2, . . . , n of the matrix G. Since m− l counts the number of random bits, it is reasonable to
assume that
m− l ≤ l ⇐⇒ m ≤ 2l,
that is we use at most as many random bits as data bits. Since
G = GHGECC =
[
0l×(m−l) Il
Im−l G
(4)
H
] [
G
(1)
ECC
G
(2)
ECC
]
=
[
G
(2)
ECC
G
(1)
ECC +G
(4)
H G
(2)
ECC
]
with, assuming w.l.o.g that GECC is in systematic form,
G
(1)
ECC =


g
(ECC)
1,1 g
(ECC)
1,2 . . . g
(ECC)
1,n
g
(ECC)
2,1 g
(ECC)
2,2 . . . g
(ECC)
2,n
...
... . . .
...
g
(ECC)
m−ℓ,1 g
(ECC)
m−ℓ,2 . . . g
(ECC)
m−ℓ,n

 =
[
Im−l 0(m−l)×l P(m−l)×(n−m)
]
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and
G
(2)
ECC =


g
(ECC)
m−ℓ+1,1 g
(ECC)
m−ℓ+1,2 . . . g
(ECC)
m−ℓ+1,n
g
(ECC)
m−ℓ+2,1 g
(ECC)
m−ℓ+2,2 . . . g
(ECC)
m−ℓ+2,n
...
... . . .
...
g
(ECC)
m,1 g
(ECC)
m,2 . . . g
(ECC)
m,n

 =
[
0l×(m−l) Il Ql×(n−m)
]
,
we can write the l × n matrix G∗ as
G∗ =


g
(ECC)
2m−2l+1,1 g
(ECC)
2m−2l+1,2 . . . g
(ECC)
2m−2l+1,n
...
... . . .
...
g
(ECC)
m,1 g
(ECC)
m,2 . . . g
(ECC)
m,n
G
(1)
ECC +G
(4)
H G
(2)
ECC


=
[
0(2l−m)×(2m−3l) I2l−m 0(2l−m)×l P
′
(2l−m)×(n−m)
G
(1)
ECC +G
(4)
H G
(2)
ECC
]
.
Now
G
(4)
H G
(2)
ECC = G
(4)
H [0l×(m−l) Il Ql×(n−m)] = [0m−l G
(4)
H G
(4)
H Ql×(n−m)]
so that finally
G∗ =
[
0(2l−m)×(2m−3l) I2l−m 0(2l−m)×l P
′
(2l−m)×(n−m)
Im−l G
(4)
H G
(4)
H Ql×(n−m) +P(m−l)×(n−m)
]
.
The requirement is that
rank(G∗) ≥ w + 1.
Since l ≤ m < n, the rank of G∗ is at most l, and it is enough to look at the rank of the l×m submatrix[
0(2l−m)×(2m−3l) I2l−m 0(2l−m)×l
Im−l G
(4)
H
]
(19)
which varies from m− l to l since the first m− l columns are linearly independent. Thus if w + 1 ≤ m− l,
the dependency condition is satisfied naturally. Otherwise, we need to build G
(4)
H such that k of its columns,
k = 1, . . . , 2l−m are linearly independent from the m− l first columns of the above matrix. To do so, it is
enough to consider the 2l−m first columns of G
(4)
H , and we consider the truncated matrix (19)[
0(2l−m)×(2m−3l) I2l−m 0(2l−m)×2l−m
Im−l A
]
where A contains the 2l−m first columns of G
(4)
H . Let us further write
A =
[
A1
A2
]
,
where A1 is a (2m− 3l)× (2l −m) matrix, and A2 is a square 2l −m matrix. To control the rank of G
∗,
we set A1 = 0 and we get
rank(G∗) = m− l+ k
where k is the number of columns of A2 which are linearly independent from the the matrix[
0(2l−m)×(2m−3l) I2l−m
Im−l
]
. (20)
Setting A2 to zero makes this computation easier. Indeed, to get k such columns, it is enough to pick k
columns from the 2l −m identity matrix. This might give some columns with zero or very few ones, which
looks like contradicting the weight condition. However, columns with higher Hamming weight can be easily
obtained by taking linear combinations of the columns which will not change the rank.
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• Dependability and Weight. Since
rank(G∗) = m− l + k
where k is the number of columns of the sub-matrix of G
(4)
H formed by taking its first 2m− l columns
and last 2m− l rows which are linearly independent from (20), it is enough to ask for
k ≥ w + 1 + l −m.
To ensure that each column of G
(4)
H has Hamming weight w, it is enough to take linear combinations
of the columns.
• Sparsity. The choice of G
(1)
H = 0l×(m−l) and G
(2)
H = Il makes the l first rows of GH as sparse as
possible, since removing any zero would make the matrix non-invertible anymore. Furthermore, the
way the dependability condition is constructed is also optimal in the sense that it starts with the least
number of 1 to get the wanted rank, and then obtains the desired Hamming weight of each column by
linear combinations.
5.2 Examples of Constructions
Take m = 2l so that m− l = l, and
GH =
[
G
(1)
H G
(2)
H
Il G
(4)
H
]
=
[
0l Il
Il Il
]
.
The matrix GH is clearly invertible. The Hamming weight of each column of G
(4)
H is 1, thus w must be
taken to be 0 or 1. The matrix G
(2)
H is chosen to be zero for increasing the sparsity of GH .
As a toy example, let us consider the (7, 4) Hamming code with
GECC =


1 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1

 ,
and
GH =


0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1

 .
We have that
GHGECC =


0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0

 .
The matrix G∗ is thus
G∗ =
(
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0
)
.
Since the requirement is that the rank of G∗ is at least w, this is clearly satisfied here since w = 1. Note
that
G−1H =


1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0

 ,
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and the cost of encoding and decoding the homophonic code is the same.
In order to increase w, we could alternatively take
GH =


0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1

 ,
for which w can be taken to be 2. Then, continuing with the (7, 4) Hamming code, we get
GHGECC =


0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1

 ,
where
G∗ =
(
1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1
)
has rank w = 2 as required. This time
G−1H =


1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0

 ,
and as expected, increasing w correspondingly decreases the sparsity of GH and its inverse.
6 Conclusion
The paper addresses the problem of design of a homophonic code for certain enhanced encoding-encryption
based communication systems, reported and analyzed from information-theoretic point of view in [11]-[12].
The design is based on the guidelines implied by security evaluation from the computational complexity
point of view. Accordingly, this paper yields the following: (i) security evaluation of the considered system
from the computational complexity point of view; (ii) guidelines for design of a dedicated homophonic coding
implied by the performed security evaluation; (iii) proposal of a dedicated homophonic code which provides
the desired level of security and at the same time provides low implementation overhead.
The security evaluation of the employed encryption is considered by hardness of recovering the secret key
based on the algebraic representation of the encryption in CPA scenario. It is shown that the addressed secret
key recovery is at least as hard as the LPN problem when, assuming an appropriate design, the corrupting
noise is ǫ = 1−(1−2p)
w+1
2 and p < 0.5 and w are the system parameters. Note that the in the average
complexity consideration, the LPN problem corresponding to the parameter ǫ is much harder than the one
with the parameter p. Accordingly, assuming that the parameters of the scheme are appropriately selected,
the complexity of the secret key recovery based on the algebraic representation appears approximately as
hard as the exhaustive search over all possible secret keys.
The results of security evaluation are considered as guidelines for design of a dedicated homophonic
encoder which provides a desired security level and minimize the implementation complexity. Assuming
that the homophonic code should be a linear one, beside the basic requirement on the invertibility and
the mixing properties of the generator matrix, the following three additional criteria are pointed out and
specified in Sections 4.1 and 4.2: (a) Weight on columns of the generator matrix; (b) rank of the generator
matrix; (c) sparsity of the generator matrix. The criteria (a) and (b) appear as an implication of the security
requirements, and the criterion (c) is related to minimization of the implementation overhead. The previous
design criteria are employed for design of a dedicated homophonic code. A generic design of the homophonic
coding dedicated to the considered security enhanced communication system is proposed and it is shown
that the design fulfills all the given criteria.
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